War in Afghanistan: Achieving a Successful Civilian Surge

By Catherine Dale

Catherine Dale, Specialist in International Security at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), is currently making an extended visit to Afghanistan.  Her comments here do not reflect the views of CRS, the Library of Congress, or the U.S. Congress.

On March 27, 2009, President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, aimed at defeating al Qaeda and preventing the future use of either country as a safe haven.  One key element of the strategy for Afghanistan was “a dramatic increase in our civilian effort.”  The premise was that for the Afghan people in their daily lives, true “security” means more than the absence of insurgents shooting at them – it also includes responsible and responsive governance, grounded in the rule of law and able to meet the needs of its citizens, giving them the sense of confidence and assurance they need to raise their children, pursue their professions, and invest in the future.  More civilians are needed to help directly in meeting those goals.

The call for a civilian surge in Afghanistan reflects in part lessons learned from the war in Iraq.  Many Iraq “old hands” argue that U.S. civilian contributions in Iraq were both late in coming, and never sufficient to meet demand.  In Iraq, the United States went to war not only with limited numbers of military forces, but also with a fraction of the civilian expertise that proved to be needed as soon as major combat operations drew to a close.  Some veterans of those efforts go so far as to argue that a more effective application of all elements of U.S. national power early on might have tempered the rise of the insurgency that later threatened to consume Iraq in irremediable civil war.  Later in the course of that war, security conditions in Iraq improved due to a combination of factors including the surge of U.S. and Iraqi forces, and the “awakening” and switching sides of many Sunni Arabs.  As that window of opportunity opened, U.S. military commanders on the ground in Iraq pleaded again for more civilian expertise – “Where’s the State Department?” “Where’s the civilian surge?”  Some more U.S. Government experts did join the fight, yet by 2008, U.S. Embassy Baghdad had initiated a strategic drawdown plan for U.S. Government civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

The push for a civilian plus-up in Afghanistan is not quite new.  As early as the final months of 2008, U.S. Embassy Kabul proposed a significant boost in U.S. Government civilian expertise, to come primarily from the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).  The additional experts would serve primarily in field positions – outside Kabul – working on PRTs, establishing new district-level teams, or providing advisory support to U.S. military task forces.  It was further proposed to provide them with some additional, flexible “ready funds” to support their work.  By spring 2009, following the announcement of the Administration’s new strategy, the civilian surge plans called for filling 56 priority positions by June 2009, and over 400 total positions by spring 2010.  Officials now suggest that the timeline will be even faster, and the total number of new civilian positions could be significantly higher.

The empirical need in Afghanistan is real – and may be far pronounced than it was in Iraq.  Thirty years of civil war ruptured the country’s economy, damaged or destroyed existing infrastructure, sundered the rule of law, and rent the fabric of human capital.  The fundamental premise of a significant increase in civilian expertise is not to step in and fill the void left by those disruptions, but rather, through training and mentoring, to help Afghans further develop their own capacity and capabilities to govern.

A number of observers have suggested that it may not be easy to find quickly hundreds of volunteers for the new posts.  U.S. civilian and military practitioners on the ground in Afghanistan stress an additional nuance – that the challenge is not merely to find recruits, but also to find the right people with the right skills, to serve in the right positions.  In a war effort that has been under-resourced for years, there is simply no slack in terms of personnel, time, attention, or infrastructure on the ground, they argue, to babysit “warm bodies.”  Remarkably – or perhaps just gratifyingly – U.S. government officials report that there has been no shortage of eager applicants, many times the numbers required to fill the new billets, including many seasoned practitioners with critical experience in complex contingencies.  For the first round of hires, at the very least, the “A Team” appears to be stepping up and volunteering.

Looking ahead, the real challenges to the success of the civilian increase may be different ones.

The first challenge is the imperative need to integrate the civilian surge with ongoing U.S. military efforts on the ground.  Currently, U.S. military forces in Afghanistan provide substantial support to the non-security lines of operation – governance and development, together with the rule of law.  To date, in the absence of a robust U.S. Government civilian presence, U.S. military forces have frequently played de facto leading roles in these areas, particularly at the provincial, district, and local levels.  All but one of the U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan are headed by military officers, who report up a military chain of command.  On average, only about three members of each PRT – out of 80 to 100 total personnel – are U.S. Government civilians.  Further, U.S. military forces have made substantial use of the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) to support reconstruction initiatives, in particular road-building, in addition to the kinds of short-term needs-alleviation projects for which CERP was originally designed.  One U.S. commander recently called CERP “a surrogate for the government’s failure to provide.”  More broadly, U.S. forces, with their far greater numbers and broader footprint, enjoy a frequency of interaction with Afghan officials at the provincial and district levels that their U.S. civilian counterparts cannot yet match.

It would make sense for a more extensive U.S. Government civilian presence to leverage and build on the groundwork laid by U.S. military forces, as military forces shift from a lead to a supporting role in non-security fields.  It would also make sense for U.S. military forces to continue to be prepared, realistically, to make up the difference until civilians are ready to assume those responsibilities.  A new, integrated U.S. Government civil-military campaign plan for Afghanistan, currently under development, should help provide a foundation for such integration.  Equally necessary are effective, ongoing coordination mechanisms, perhaps building on the current U.S. Government civil-military Executive Working Group (EWG), and its working-level secretariat, the infelicitously-named Integrated Civil-Military Action Group (ICMAG).  To date, the EWG and ICMAG structure seems like a mere skeleton of the far more robust coordination mechanisms that developed over time between U.S. Embassy Baghdad and the Multi-National Force-Iraq headquarters, but they are a great start.

The second challenge is the need to ensure Afghan participation in the civilian increase, which is, after all, designed to boost Afghan capacity.  U.S. Government plans have called for including some 600 Afghan counterparts, working with the new U.S. civilians in Kabul and in field locations.  But U.S. Government officials already report a competition among members of the international community for talented Afghan counterparts and staff.  At the provincial and district levels, U.S. officials report low levels of literacy as well as relevant professional experience.  Overcoming that entrenched human capital deficit – perhaps through steps such as strengthening Afghanistan’s Civil Service Commission, boosting support for secondary education and training, and providing competitive salaries for government service – may be key to the success of further capacity-building initiatives.

The third challenge involves wrestling with the question, “How much help is enough?”  In Iraq, by 2008, U.S. Government civilian and military officials were engaging in a very healthy debate about the extent to which the U.S. Government should continue to support their Iraqi military and civilian counterparts. U.S. officials posed the questions: “When is it time to take off the training wheels?” “To what extent should we ‘let them fail’?”  Too little assistance could conceivably lead to catastrophic failures, while too much assistance could sap initiative, send the wrong signals, and remove the incentive for host nation officials to shoulder full responsibility.

The question is designed to help guard against a more typical U.S. Government – and especially, U.S. military – gut reaction in favor of marching out and simply solving the problem, in favor of a more difficult and indirect approach: ensuring that host nation officials have the technical and management skills they need to manage and lead on their own.  This set of concerns might call for a more concerted use of mentors – not just technical experts, but senior leaders (including former senior government officials), able to mentor Afghan officials in the running of complex organizations.  For its part, the Government of Afghanistan has clearly indicated that it wants a vote about the kinds of international civilian expertise provided, and where and how those officials serve.

The war in Afghanistan is first and foremost about Afghanistan itself – its people and its future.  At the same time, the war may also serve as a test case for the U.S. Government – for its ability to execute a balanced, integrated application of all elements of U.S. national power.  Moreover, 2009 is likely to be a critical juncture in that “test”, with the introduction of a new U.S. Government strategy, new U.S. civilian and military leadership teams in Kabul, and far more concerted national – and international – attention to the effort.  It is a stellar opportunity to “get it right”, and to boost prospects not only for Afghanistan’s success but for our own ability to execute complex operations in the future.